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You shall not pass: how facial variability
and feedback affect the detection of lowprevalence fake IDs
Dawn R. Weatherford1,2* , William Blake Erickson1, Jasmyne Thomas1, Mary E. Walker1 and Barret Schein2

Abstract
In many real-world settings, individuals rarely present another person’s ID, which increases the likelihood that a
screener will fail to detect it. Three experiments examined how within-person variability (i.e., differences between
two images of the same person) and feedback may have influenced criterion shifting, thought to be one of the
sources of the low-prevalence effect (LPE). Participants made identity judgments of a target face and an ID under
either high, medium, or low mismatch prevalence. Feedback appeared after every trial, only error trials, or no trials.
Experiment 1 used two controlled images taken on the same day. Experiment 2 used two controlled images taken
at least 6 months apart. Experiment 3 used one controlled and one ambient image taken at least 1 year apart.
Importantly, receiver operating characteristic curves revealed that feedback and greater within-person variability
exacerbated the LPE by affecting both criterion and discriminability. These results carry implications for many realworld settings, such as border crossings and airports, where identity screening plays a major role in securing public
safety.
Keywords: Low-prevalence effect, Facial identification, Imposter identification, Performance feedback, Receiver
operating characteristic curves

Significance statement
Determining an unfamiliar person’s identity is critically
important to a wide variety of security-related occupations such as transportation-security screeners, border
patrol agents, police officers, and other security
personnel. These personnel typically compare a photo
identification card (i.e., ID) to a live person before permitting access to restricted goods, services, and areas.
Acceptable forms of ID are produced by a variety of
agencies that embed features such as light-sensitive
strips, ghost images, and material properties to help a
screener distinguish a genuine from a fake ID. However,
a genuine ID can still be presented by a person who is
not pictured on the card. This ID is still considered fake;
but, screeners need to detect the mismatched identities
in order to reject it. Our research focuses on a screener’s
ability to detect a fake ID under such circumstances
when it is rare. We explore how response formats (e.g.,
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yes/no decisions compared to confidence-based decisions), real-world concerns (e.g., the degree of control in
manipulating within-person and between-person variability), and possible interventions (e.g., feedback) may
alter the magnitude of the effect.
Unfortunately, research indicates that detecting the
identity of an unfamiliar person is more difficult than it
may seem (e.g., Kemp, Towell, & Pike, 1997; Robertson,
Noyes, Dowsett, Jenkins, & Burton, 2016; White, Burton,
Jenkins, & Kemp, 2014). Errors arise because two images
of the same person can vary widely based on differences
in age, hairstyles, weight, and a number of other factors.
Similarly, two images of different people can look incredibly similar. Thus, determining a person’s identity
requires visually searching the two different images (e.g.,
photo ID and live person) for two different types of cues.
Observers must be able to distinguish between match
cues that signal a single identity i.e., within-person variability; (e.g., Burton, 2013) and mismatch cues that signal
two different identities i.e., between-person variability; e.g.,
(Jenkins, White, Van Montfort, & Burton, 2011).
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Much like other complex visual search tasks, research
shows that if one type of target—in this instance a genuine
ID or fake ID—is infrequent, then an observer will often
fail to identify it (Hout, Walenchok, Goldinger, & Wolfe,
2015; Rich et al., 2008; Wolfe et al., 2007). This lowprevalence effect (LPE) decreases the successful identification of weapons in real-world baggage-screening scenarios
(e.g., Lau & Huang, 2010) and abnormalities during radiological screenings (e.g., Drew, Võ, & Wolfe, 2013) because
both weapons and abnormalities appear less often during
these searches than high-prevalence items such as aerosol
cans or tumors.
Extending to work with faces, Papesh and colleagues
(Papesh & Goldinger, 2014; Papesh, Heisick, & Warner,
2018) found that participants failed to detect identity
mismatches when they were rare. In a series of studies,
participants viewed image pairs of a target face displayed
beside an ID card. For each pair, participants made untimed yes/no decisions about whether the two images
represented the same person. Errors persisted on mismatch trials when mismatch prevalence was low, despite
warning participants after incorrect decisions, directing
participants to avoid errors through careful deliberation,
and allowing participants to reconsider their initial
decisions.
The low-prevalence effect (LPE)

Although a complete explanation of the LPE is still a
matter of debate, the relatively robust literature in
object-identification search tasks (e.g., weapons, tumors)
provides an important theoretical foundation for its origins. Studies have primarily investigated whether the
LPE is driven by early visual search termination (i.e.,
making an identification decision before exhaustively
searching an entire visual array) or criterion shifting (i.e.,
visually fixating upon the correct cue, but determining
that it does not sufficiently exceed the threshold to be
identified as such).
If these same mechanisms are applied to facialidentification tasks, the low prevalence of fake IDs can
be explained as a failure to identify mismatch cues due
to the wide within-person variability between IDs and
the individuals presenting them. In other words, when
presented with a high frequency of genuine IDs, the evidence for a mismatch decision must be sufficiently high
in order to identify the ID as fake. In the absence of
strong and more unambiguous visual cues that signal a
mismatch (i.e., the person presenting the ID is of a
different race than the photo), observers decide that two
facial images belong to the same person. Following the
results of their facial-identification experiments, Papesh
and colleagues’ (Papesh et al., 2018; Papesh & Goldinger,
2014) findings suggest that the LPE exerts its influence
by creating a context that emphasizes cue search for
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identity matches. Therefore, participants fail to notice
the diagnostic cues that signal between-person variability
on mismatch trials because they terminated their search
too quickly and/or attended only to match cues. These
different search strategies resulted in shorter reaction
times on inaccurate mismatch trials. However, these
initial investigations into how the LPE affects facial identification are limited in ways that the current studies aim
to explore.
The current research

The current studies contribute to this important area by
more closely investigating factors that influence realworld security personnel and may affect criterion shifting in a serial decision-making task. First, within-person
variability can affect the degree to which an individual
resembles themselves over a lapse of time. Because ID
photos can be valid for up to 10 years (e.g., United States
passport documents), a wide variety of facial changes
likely reduce the ability to adequately differentiate
between an imposter presenting someone else’s ID and a
legitimate person who has just changed substantially
since their image was taken. In the current studies, we
more strongly account for the degree to which image
pairs look similar by representing different degrees of
within-person variability. As a starting point, Experiment
1 used two controlled images that were taken on the
same day with different cameras. To increase realism,
Experiment 2 used two controlled images taken at least
6 months apart. Finally, Experiment 3 approximated the
most realistic within-person variability by using one controlled image and one ambient image taken at least 1
year apart. Attention was also paid to ensuring sufficient
between-person variability to approximate real-world
settings, where an imposter presenting someone else’s
ID must be at least adequately convincing to be believable. To represent convincing degrees of betweenperson variability, we created high-similarity mismatches
(described in “Materials”) by pairing identities rated by
an independent group of participants.
Second, feedback may influence the degree of the LPE
in this face-matching task. Performance feedback in
real-world security settings is delivered in a variety of
ways. For instance, a screener might receive feedback by
way of external validation (e.g., a screened individual is
able to produce alternative forms of ID when prompted)
or external information (e.g., a supervisor or confederate
completes a random screening check for quality control).
Although decision feedback is relatively rare compared
to the vast majority of decisions that receive no additional scrutiny, it remains important to explore as a
straightforward and plausible intervention strategy
aimed at affecting criterion shifting. Further, professional
identity screeners very typically receive feedback during
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their initial training period (Towler et al., 2019). Predictions about feedback are mixed, with some evidence suggesting its use as effective (Alenezi, Bindemann, Fysh, &
Johnston, 2015; White, Kemp, Jenkins, & Burton, 2014)
and others suggesting its use as ineffective or even detrimental (Papesh et al., 2018; Wolfe et al., 2007). Therefore,
we again approached Experiment 1 as a means to replicate
previous findings by providing feedback only in the case
of errors (Papesh & Goldinger, 2014). Afterwards, Experiments 2 and 3 manipulated feedback more fully.
In order to consider the influences of these real-world
factors, all three experiments adopted a variant of the
traditional paradigm adapted from (Papesh & Goldinger,
2014) wherein participants made several decisions about
whether a target face matched an ID. However, instead
of yes/no judgments, participants made identity decisions on a 1–6 scale that allowed us to build receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) curves (described in “Results”) and calculate discriminability and criterion. We
predicted that, if the LPE exerts its influence, then both
discrimination and criterion would be affected under
low mismatch prevalence. However, the LPE may be reduced or nearly eliminated when image pairs represent
low within-person variability (Experiment 1) compared
to higher within-person variability (Experiment 2 and
Experiment 3). In terms of feedback, we remained agnostic, as some evidence (Alenezi & Bindemann, 2013;
White, Kemp, et al., 2014) would predict that feedback
will increase discriminability and criterion (i.e., combat
criterion shifts and decrease the likelihood of early
search termination), whereas other evidence (e.g., Papesh
et al., 2018) would predict that feedback will decrease
discriminability and criterion (as a function of drawing
attention to the low mismatch prevalence, thereby exacerbating the effect).

(Glasgow Unfamiliar Face Database, http://www.facevar.
com/downloads). Adapting Papesh and Goldinger
(2014), each trial presented a target face (approximately
5 in. by 5 in.) beside an ID card (approximately 2.25 in.
by 1.5 in.; see Fig. 1). EPrime presented images to participants on a 22-inch monitor such that target identities
the occupied the larger portion of the left side of the
screen and ID card identities were embedded within one
of several prototypical ID card images on the right side
of the screen.
Mismatch identity pairs displayed two photographs of
two different people (see Fig. 1, right column). Mismatch
identities were paired using reported similarity ratings
(all between 0.3 and 0.6 (M = 0.40, SD = .09), see Bruce
et al., 1999; Burton, White, & McNeill, 2010)1 Match
and mismatch identities were fully counterbalanced and
no images repeated across trials, such that each identity
was equally likely to appear beside another photograph of
themselves as they were a photograph of another person.

Experiment 1

Results

Method
Participants

Undergraduate students (N = 91; Mage = 19 years; 68 female) participated in the experiment in exchange for
partial course credit. Power analyses confirmed the sufficiency of this sample size for all omnibus tests (i.e., β −
1 > .95). Self-reported race reflected a diverse sample (15
Black/African American, 70 White/Caucasian, 1 Hispanic/Latino, 4 Asian/Asian-American/Pacific Islander,
and 1). All participants reported normal or corrected-tonormal vision.
Materials

One-hundred and forty image pairs were selected for
use in the experiment. Each match pair contained two
different front-facing photographs of the same person,
taken on the same day with two different cameras

Design and procedure

After providing informed consent, participants made 140
untimed identity decisions under either high (80%),
medium (50%), or low (20%) mismatch prevalence. Participants answered “Are these images of the same person?” by selecting a number on a 1–6 scale (1 = definitely
no, 6 = definitely yes). To replicate the experimental conditions of Papesh and Goldinger (2014), participants viewed
a 2-s penalty screen following incorrect decisions on
match trials and a 4-s penalty screen following incorrect
decisions to mismatch trials.2 After completing all trials,
participants provided demographic information and were
debriefed.

To allow more direct comparison with findings derived
from yes/no judgments in previous studies, we first
calculated accuracy by collapsing the response scale, with
responses 1–3 coded as correct for mismatch trials and
responses 4–6 coded as correct for match trials. These
collapsed values were used to calculate accuracy and
signal detection analyses. After satisfying that connection
with the literature, we considered the full range of
responses to construct ROC curves that more completely
explore discriminability across all levels of confidence.
1

In order to calculate similarity, Bruce et al., 1999 asked participants to
sort candidate images from the database into piles of similar-looking
individuals. These similarity values represent the frequency with which
identities were sorted into the same pile.
2
Papesh and Goldinger (2014) argued that these penalties served the
dual purpose of encouraging participants to stay invested in the task,
as well as simulating the real-world consequences of the two different
incorrect decisions.
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Fig. 1 Example stimuli of identities used in Experiment 1 (top row), Experiment 2 (middle row), and Experiment 3 (bottom row). The left column
represents match pairs, whereas the right column represents mismatch pairs. All images used with permission

Accuracy

We analyzed accuracy using a 2 (Match Type-within:
match, mismatch) × 3 (Mismatch prevalence-between:
80%, 50%, 20%) mixed-methods analysis of variance
(ANOVA). Unless otherwise stated, we set alpha at .05
and corrected for Type 1 error inflation across all statistical tests using Bonferroni post-hoc analyses. We found
a main effect of match type, F (1,88) = 17.768, p < .001,
η2 p = .168 and no main effect of prevalence, F (2,
88) = .99, p = .375, η2 p = .022. However, this main effect
was qualified by an interaction between match type and
mismatch prevalence, F (2,88) = 7.33, p = .001, η2 p = .143.
As can be seen in Fig. 2a, planned follow-up analyses indicated that participants were more accurate for match trials
(M = .89, SD = .09) than mismatch trials (M = .82, SD = .11)
across all mismatch prevalence conditions (a trend we address when considering the influence of facial variability
below); however, accuracy followed a mirror effect across
different prevalence rates. Error rate analysis followed the
same pattern and magnitude of results.

Signal detection measures

We also analyzed performance using signal detection
measures, sensitivity (d’):

0

d ¼ zðFalse alarmsÞ−zðHitsÞ

ð1Þ

where higher values of d’ indicate superior recognition
memory while accounting for response bias. To account
for extreme performance levels (e.g., hit or false alarm
rates of zero), extreme values are replaced by 1–2/N for
rates of 1 or 2/N of 0, where N represents the number of
trials of that type. We were also calculated response criterion (C);
C¼

−1ððFalse alarmsÞ þ zðHitsÞÞ
2

ð2Þ

Figure 1 displays all data by prevalence and feedback
conditions. For d’, a between-subjects ANOVA revealed
no main effect of mismatch prevalence, F (2,88) = .19,
p = .831, η2 p = .004. For C, a between-subjects ANOVA
revealed a main effect of mismatch prevalence, F (2,
74) = 9.89, p < .001, η2 p = .194. As predicted by the
criterion-shift explanation of the LPE, mismatch prevalence affected criterion in linear fashion, with the low
mismatch prevalence group demonstrating a more
liberal criterion than the high- and medium-prevalence
conditions.

Weatherford et al. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications
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Fig. 2 Signal detection measures of discriminability (d’) and response bias (C) at each mismatch prevalence rate (high, medium, and low) for
Experiments 1 (a and b), 2, (c and d), and 3 (e and f). Figures for Experiments 2 and 3 additionally break down data by feedback condition (error-only,
full, and none)

Weatherford et al. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications

Area under the curve

A further analysis that can illuminate the effect of mismatch prevalence rates on criterion shifting simultaneously considers discriminability across a range of
criterion values. To this end, we calculated area under
the curve (AUC). The cumulative proportions of “1”,“2”,
“3”, “4”, “5”, and “6” responses made by each participant
within each prevalence condition from 6 (the highest criterion level) to 2 (the lowest criterion level) were calculated for each pair type (match or mismatch) and plotted
in ROC space for three curves. The space is arranged
such that match proportional accuracy is plotted along
the vertical axis from 0 at the origin to 1 at its maximum
for match decisions, and along the horizontal axis from
0 at the origin to 1 at its maximum for mismatch decisions. Thus, a diagonal from coordinate 0,0 to 1,1 indicates chance performance. Coordinates above this
diagonal indicate accuracy above chance; coordinates
below this diagonal indicate accuracy below chance. As
can be seen from Fig. 3, accuracy was generally high in
each mismatch prevalence condition as indicated by
each curve bowing toward the upper left of the ROC
space.
Next, we computed the partial area under the curve
(pAUC) scores for each ROC curve and conducted pairwise comparisons among each mismatch prevalence
condition (see Table 1). Scores for full AUCs typically
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range from .50 (chance performance) to 1.00 (perfect
performance). Although several methods of calculating
these scores exist, most involve extrapolating the leftmost and right-most data points of each ROC curve to
the 0,0 and 1,1 coordinates on the plot. This approach
puts in jeopardy interpretations made by comparing two
ROCs on a plot which do not perfectly overlap along the
x-axis, as different degrees of extrapolation are needed
for each. Therefore, for each ROC curve comparison, we
compared only those portions where the two curves do
overlap. We used the pROC toolbox (Robin et al., 2011)
in R to compute pAUC scores for the curves corresponding to each prevalence level within sub-portions of
the aggregate ROCs that overlapped along the x-axis of
the ROC plots. In addition, because there were three
comparisons in total, the alpha level for significance decisions was adjusted to .017.
For the comparison between low mismatch prevalence
and medium mismatch prevalence, the area spanned by the
low condition (pAUC = .44) was less than the area spanned
by the medium condition (AUC = .47), D = − 5.85, p < .001.
For the medium and high conditions, the area spanned by
medium mismatch prevalence (pAUC = .45) was greater
than high mismatch prevalence (pAUC = .44), D = 3.47,
p < .001. Comparisons between the low and high conditions
yielded no differences in pAUCs.
Discussion

Fig. 3 Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves by mismatch
prevalence group. Area under the curve (AUC) calculated using the
trapezoidal method. To ease comparison, the third point on each
ROC for high, medium, and low mismatch prevalence is highlighted
to show a slight rightward shift along the x-axis

Experiment 1 confirmed our initial predictions and replicated the findings of Papesh and Goldinger (2014) that
low mismatch prevalence decreased accuracy when we
collapsed across the range of 1–6 judgments to replicate
the yes/no paradigms that were previously adopted (e.g.,
Papesh et al., 2018; Papesh & Goldinger, 2014). Data
replicated the classic mirror effect across the three mismatch prevalence rates, with match accuracy performance increasing from high to low mismatch prevalence
and mismatch accuracy decreasing from high to low
mismatch prevalence. Next, we explored criterion and
discriminability using ROC curves. This measure, previously unavailable with the yes/no format of other work,
confirmed that prevalence rates affected criterion. However, this more sensitive instrument revealed a much
smaller difference on discriminability by prevalence —
participants’ overall discriminability was very high, regardless of mismatch prevalence condition.
The results of the ROC curves are promising for translation to real-world identification screening tasks. However, some marked differences between our design and
the conditions of real-world security scenarios are
worthy of consideration before making any claims about
generalizability. Therefore, Experiments 2 and 3 examined the magnitude of the LPE across three additional
differences that should theoretically affect criterion.

(2020) 5:3
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Table 1 Lower and upper receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve overlap boundaries used for each partial area under the
curve (pAUC) analysis, including D value for each comparison
Mismatch prevalence comparisons

Partial ROC boundaries

D

Lower

Upper

.44

.94

Experiment 1
Low prevalence vs. medium prevalence

5.86a

Low prevalence vs. high prevalence

.44

.93

2.72a

Medium prevalence vs. high prevalence

.44

.93

3.33a

Low prevalence vs. medium prevalence

.29

.92

4.21a

Low prevalence vs. high prevalence

.41

.92

2.38a

Medium prevalence vs. high prevalence

.41

.96

1.20

Low prevalence vs. medium prevalence

.31

.90

2.67a

Low prevalence vs. high prevalence

.39

.90

2.73a

Medium prevalence vs. high prevalence

.39

.96

.77

Experiment 2

Experiment 3

a

Note: Indicates a significant difference at p < .017, corrected for multiple comparisons

Experiment 2
The influence of facial variability

Real-life identification tasks rarely involve comparing a
photo ID to a person when that ID was taken on the
same day. Further, identity screeners see people from all
over the world who do not share such a high degree of
visual similarity. Subsequently, many identity-matching
studies underscore the need to control for both withinperson and between-person variability in a way that
more strongly maps onto these real-world conditions
(Burton, 2013; Megreya, Sandford, & Burton, 2013).
Although constraining experimental materials might increase internal validity, it also might produce outcomes
that drastically underestimate externally valid facial variability and, therefore, mask potential generalizability.
The Glasgow Unfamiliar Face Database (GUFD) (Experiment 1) includes images taken on the same day,
which limits within-person variability, of mostly (if not
exclusively) young, light-skinned individuals, which
limits between-person variability. This database’s limited
facial variability likely affected participants’ criteria based
upon information at the item-level (i.e., considering only
information about the presented image pair on screen)
and series-level (i.e., considering information across successive trials). At the item-level, low within-person variability may have contributed to the significantly higher
accuracy for our match than mismatch trials overall. It
stands to reason that images taken approximately 15 min
apart would bear a striking resemblance to one another
in terms of a variety of both noticeable (e.g., hairstyle)
and subtle (e.g., skin luminance) visual cues. Therefore,
the low degree of within-person variability increases
matched cues across images. At the series-level, such
unrealistically high similarity between match pairs likely

made mismatch cues more distinctive in contrast i.e.,
more obvious difference in the context of similarity;
(e.g., Hunt, 2006). Mismatches may have popped out
more so than would have been expected in a more variable image set, and, therefore, reduced participants’ tolerance for perceptual differences as they calibrated their
expectations for natural variations in a person’s appearance from day to day (see also, Menon, White, & Kemp,
2015a for a targeted approach to manipulating expected
identity variation that produced findings that align with
our rationale).
Previous identity matching studies in the lowprevalence literature confirm that stimulus variability
can alter the interpretation of results. For example,
Bindemann, Avetisyan, and Blackwell (2010) also used
the GUFD to compare identity matching performance
across five different experiments. Mismatch prevalence
was varied in the first 49 of 50 trials, such that participants
with saw either 24 mismatches (high) or 0 mismatches
(low). When the authors compared performance on a final
critical mismatch trial, several variations of the study confirmed that the high mismatch prevalence group committed more mismatch errors. On the face of it, these results
suggest that low mismatch prevalence (2%) did not produce the classic LPE. However, we caution against that interpretation on the basis of how mismatch trials were
selected. The authors strategically selected the critical mismatch image pairs with higher similar ratings (M = .56)
than noncritical mismatch image pairs (M = .20). In other
words, participants in the high-prevalence group saw
more obvious mismatches that increased their likelihood
of missing a less obvious mismatch.
More recent work has added to our understanding of
the LPE by using face databases containing images taken
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multiple days (if not years in some instances) apart,
(Papesh and Goldinger, 2014; Papesh et al., 2018) and
another recent study (Susa, Michael, Dessenberger, &
Meissner, 2019) found the LPE. This latter study used
images specifically designed to test cross-race influences,
and, therefore, portrayed a wider-degree of within- and
between-person variability. Therefore, we considered it
important to utilize an image set that more strongly
represents real-world facial variability. Experiments 2
and 3 included a racially diverse database with multiple
images of each identity taken with different cameras at
different times.
The influence of differing prevalence rates

Although our low mismatch prevalence group did experience fewer mismatch trials overall, a 20% mismatch
prevalence rate is still far greater than real-world
settings. Although no exact figure exists, one could estimate that a very small percentage (i.e., < 1%) of passengers present a fake ID, making it quite a bit rarer than
we have accounted for here. Nevertheless, participants in
both the high and low mismatch prevalence groups were
sensitive to the imbalance, which suggests that prevalence effects follow a continuous function. Put another
way, participants made more errors on whichever type
of trial was relatively rarer (either 20% mismatches or
20% matches). Therefore, if participants were sensitive
enough to modify their decisions in response to differences between 80/20 prevalence rates, then our results
likely underestimate the errors one could expect in a
typical identity-screening scenario. Studies outside of the
facial recognition literature support this interpretation
by confirming that a greater degree of imbalance (Mitroff
& Biggs, 2014; Wolfe & Van Wert, 2010) increases the
magnitude of the LPE. Although an ultra-rare prevalence
condition in this particular task would introduce its own
set of problems, Experiments 2 and 3 adopted a greater
degree of imbalance (i.e., 90/10 and 10/90) against which
to compare to an equivalent prevalence group.
The influence of feedback

Although feedback in real-world settings is rare, it is
naturally skewed toward combating mismatch errors for
two primary reasons. First, most IDs that screeners
check are genuine and presented by their rightful owner
(a fact also responsible for the LPE). Second, screeners
in many settings (e.g., airport security, liquor store cashiers) may never be made aware of that they accepted a
fake ID because they are unlikely to encounter that individual again. However, they are made aware when they
erroneously reject an authentic ID if the individual is
able to provide alternative means of identification.
Therefore, investigating the effect of feedback is crucial
when considering empirically driven training regimens
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designed to reduce the LPE, particularly if it persists
under these real-world situations. Because the LPE literature with facial-identification tasks is both fractured
in its use and findings with feedback, some overview of
the efficacy of feedback interventions on learning is in
order before we proceed with our specific predictions.
The position that feedback improves performance
dates in psychological science to the earliest days of behaviorism (e.g., Thorndike’s (1927) Law of Effect). Many
behaviorists eschewed theory, so the benefits of feedback
were often taken at face value. Kluger and DeNisi’s
(1996) Feedback Intervention Theory provides a framework from which we can make predictions relevant to
security screening. Feedback Intervention Theory presupposes that five components are required for feedback
to modify performance at a given task. First, a gap exists
between the performance upon which feedback is given
and the “standard” (i.e., the desired level of performance). Second, the various goals related to task performance are organized hierarchically. Third, feedback can
only regulate future behavior when the gap between
current performance and the standard receives the individual’s attention. Fourth, attention moderates the ranking that a particular standard has in the goal hierarchy.
Fifth and finally, feedback interventions affect behavioral
outcomes by shifting attention within this hierarchy,
thereby reordering the various goals.
The success or failure of a particular feedback intervention relies on the specific aspects of the task to which feedback draws attention. Given this, Kluger and DeNisi (1996)
concluded that feedback exerts its greatest influence when
tasks are sufficiently challenging, yet concrete (i.e., tasks
that are too easy, difficult, or nebulous are unlikely to benefit), and when it focuses attention towards cues related to
the task’s standard rather than to the individual (e.g., mere
praise or admonishment may alter feelings of self-efficacy,
but they do not necessarily affect performance).
Central to the current studies is the differential attention paid to match and mismatch cues observable in
faces presented side-by-side, and how feedback affects
where these cues lie within matching task’s goal hierarchy. Both cue types are shared within and between
face-identity images dichotomously (i.e., facial features
can only match or mismatch). The observer, then, must
decide whether match cues outweigh mismatch cues
when deciding whether two face images belong to the
same identity. According to Feedback Intervention Theory, feedback would operate in a face-matching task by
shifting attention within the goal hierarchy to cues that
are most likely to match between face images belonging
to the same identity. Therefore, it would make the visual
system more sensitive to within-person variability.
Indeed, multiple studies demonstrate that feedback improves unfamiliar face-matching performance (Alenezi &
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Bindemann, 2013; White, Kemp, et al., 2014). However,
the opposite influence of feedback has also been argued
(Papesh et al., 2018). To date, the facial-identification paradigms that failed to find an effect of low mismatch prevalence (Bindemann et al., 2010; Stephens, Semmler, &
Sauer, 2017) did not incorporate trial-by-trial feedback.
Under such conditions, Feedback Intervention Theory
would predict that the absence of feedback would not
draw attention to the imbalanced trial types, thus not
altering the cue hierarchy. Participants may not even be
explicitly aware of the different mismatch prevalence rates
and assume successful task performance. To more directly
test this possibility, we more fully explored feedback with
our modified paradigm using image sets with high facial
variability.
Predictions

If more realistic facial variability (as would be the
case with a greater lapse in time between images of a
diverse group of people) also increases the difficulty
of the task and exacerbates the LPE, then discriminability should decrease when mismatches are either
infrequent or frequent (compared to when matches
and mismatches are balanced). We may also see evidence of criterion shifting, as a greater degree of
within-person variability might interact with prevalence to shift criterion even more liberally under low
mismatch prevalence and conservatively under high
mismatch prevalence than with more similar-looking
match pairs. In contrast, if a wider degree of
between-person and within-person variability does not
interact with mismatch prevalence, then we expect to
replicate the criterion shifting seen in Experiment 1,
but not necessarily see differences in discriminability
by mismatch prevalence.
With regards to our predictions about feedback,
Feedback Intervention Theory would predict that
varying mismatch prevalence will interact with the effect of feedback on mismatch accuracy in fairly
straightforward ways: Low mismatch prevalence
within a set of trials will yield fewer opportunities to
make mismatch errors, and, therefore, fewer opportunities to modify the standard cue hierarchy toward
attending to mismatch cues. This finding should be
true, and reduce discriminability, in either of the imbalanced mismatch prevalence rates. When mismatch
prevalence is low, feedback will increase the weight of
match cues in the hierarchy, resulting in imbalanced
performance favoring match trials (but overall reduced discriminability). When mismatch prevalence is
higher, feedback will increase the weight of mismatch
cues in the hierarchy, resulting in imbalanced performance favoring mismatch trials (but overall reduced discriminability).
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Method
Participants

Undergraduate students (N = 83) participated in the
experiment (Mage = 24.1 years; 62 female) in exchange
for partial course credit. Power analyses confirmed the
sufficiency of this sample size for all omnibus tests (i.e.,
β − 1 > .88). Self-reported race reflected a diverse sample
(7 Black/African American, 17 White/Caucasian, 54
Hispanic/Latino, 1 Asian/Pacific Islander, and 3 other
with 1 failing to respond). All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Materials

For Experiments 2 and 3, we used a face database with a
complete collection of images for each of 100 unique
identities between the ages of 18 and 30 years and ethnic/racial categories aligned with the 2010 U.S. Census
(Selfies for Science; Weatherford, Ottoson, Cocherell, &
Erickson, 2016 used with permission). In order to systematically control non-face image properties, acceptable
photographs were cropped to a standard size and minor
artificial features (e.g., earrings) were naturalistically removed using Adobe Photoshop CS7. Front-facing static
images for each identity included (1) a high-resolution
image taken with a neutral expression in front a blue
background, (2) a student ID photograph taken on a different day with a different camera, and (3) a participantsubmitted ambient facial image (i.e., selfie) that included
full face, no filters or digital alterations, and was taken at
least 1 year prior to the high-resolution controlled
image.3 To create plausible mismatch trials, identities
were paired using reported similarity ratings provided by
an independent group of raters. Match and mismatch
identities were fully counterbalanced and no images repeated across trials.
Design and procedure

The experiment included a 3 (Mismatch prevalence:
high 90%, medium 50%, or low 10%) × 3 (feedback:
error, full, or none) between-participants factorial design. Participants made 100 untimed decisions about
whether a target image (a high-resolution controlled
image) represented the same person as an image embedded in an ID card (a student ID image). The procedure
was identical to Experiment 1 with the exception of the
feedback manipulation. In the error-only feedback condition, participants viewed penalty screens as described
3

Although participant-submitted images did undergo minor alterations
(e.g., cropping to remove background details) in Photoshop CS7, we
retained most of the variability as representative of these image types
more generally. Predictably, participants did submit mostly flattering
images. However, we did not accept any images that were changed to
alter facial structure (e.g., camera filters) or other means to artificially
alter perceptual information (e.g., teeth-whitening, eye-brightening).
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in Experiment 1. In the full-feedback condition, participants viewed a 2.5-s feedback screen after every trial. In
the no-feedback condition, participants viewed a 2.5-s
black inter-stimulus interval screen after each trial.
Results
Accuracy

We analyzed our data using a 2 (Match Type-within:
match, mismatch) × 3 (Mismatch prevalence-between:
high, medium, low) × 3 (Feedback-between: error, full,
or none) mixed-methods ANOVA. For accuracy (Fig. 3),
there was a main effect of match type, F (1,74) = 20.35,
p < .001, η2 p = .216, a main effect of mismatch prevalence, F (2,74) = 6.99, p = .002, η2 p = .159, but no main
effect of feedback F (2,74) = .33, p = .717. However, these
main effects were qualified by an three-way interaction,
F (4,74) = 9.36, p < .001, η2 p = .336 (Figure available in
“Additional file 1”). Simple main effects of mismatch
prevalence on errors within each level of feedback revealed a simple main effect of mismatch prevalence
within error-only feedback, F (2, 74) = 3.14, p = .049,
η2p = .078, and also within full feedback, F (2,74) = 3.39,
p = .039, η2p = .084. The no-feedback condition yielded
no simple effect of mismatch prevalence.
These results followed the same pattern as observed in
Experiment 1. In line with the predictions of Feedback
Intervention Theory, feedback improved performance of
high-prevalence trial types (e.g., high prevalence of mismatch trials or high prevalence of matched trials) in the
imbalanced conditions at the expense of low mismatch
prevalence trial types.
Signal detection measures

As with Experiment 1, we also considered the criterionshift explanation of the LPE. Signal detection measures
are represented graphically in Fig. 1. For d’, a betweensubjects ANOVA revealed a main effect of mismatch
prevalence, F (2,74) = 5.16, p = .008, η2 p = .122, but no
main effect of feedback, F (2,77) = 1.21, p = .304, η2
p = .032. The interaction between feedback and mismatch prevalence did not reach significance. For C, a
between-subjects ANOVA revealed a main effect of mismatch prevalence, F (2,74) = 20.98, p < .001, η2 p = .362,
but no main effect of feedback, F (2,74) = .572, p = .567,
η2 p = .015. However, any main effects were qualified by
an interaction between mismatch prevalence and feedback, F (4,74) = 9.61, p < .001, η2 p = .342. Simple main
effects tests of mismatch prevalence within each level of
feedback revealed a simple main effect of mismatch
prevalence within error-only feedback, F (2, 74) = 18.24,
p < .001, η2 p = .330, and also within full feedback, F (2,
74) = 21.90, p < .001, η2 p = .372. The no-feedback condition yielded no simple effect of mismatch prevalence.
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Area under the curve

Due to the inordinately large number of comparisons in
our complete design using all possible mismatch prevalence
and feedback variations, we collapsed across feedback conditions to allow more straightforward comparison to Experiment 1’s results. As seen in Fig. 4, overall
discriminability reduced compared to the high performance
in Experiment 1. For the comparison between low mismatch prevalence and medium mismatch prevalence, the
area spanned by low prevalence (pAUC = .42) was less than
the pAUC for medium prevalence (pAUC = .48), D = 4.21,
p < .001. For the low mismatch prevalence to high mismatch prevalence comparison, low prevalence spanned a
smaller area (pAUC = .34) than high prevalence (pAUC =
.39), D = 2.38, p = .006. Medium and high conditions were
equivalent, p > .2.

Discussion

Similar to Experiment 1, we find support for criterion
shifting. Unlike Experiment 1, Experiment 2’s paradigm resulted not only in differences in criterion, but
also discriminability, by mismatch prevalence. These
findings align well with other recent LPE studies in
the facial-identification literature (e.g., Papesh et al.,
2018; Papesh & Goldinger, 2014; Susa et al., 2019)
and perhaps explain the lack of an effect in others
(e.g., Bindemann et al., 2010; Stephens et al., 2017).
This latter study and others like it used image sets
with low between-person variability (e.g., Glasgow
Face Matching Test; Burton et al., 2010). By contrast,
we used an image set with more realistic variability
and external validity. With a greater span of time between the two comparison images, match trials were
likely less strikingly obvious.
Additionally, we found that feedback interacted with
prevalence to produce differences in discriminability and
criterion. As Feedback Intervention Theory predicts, any
imbalance in trial types shifts the ranking of cues in the
hierarchy when feedback (either error or full) emphasizes it. In response to imbalanced prevalence rates, participants shifted their criterion to either be more liberal
when fake IDs were rare or more conservative when they
were frequent.
Having established two different effects using different stimulus sets, Experiment 3 aimed to replicate
and extend results to the most visually variable image
set in the series. Ambient images may be the most
representative of how individuals may present themselves during identification screenings. If this increasingly greater challenge between images follows the
pattern of results of Experiment 2, we can have
greater assurance of patterns of behavior that might
emerge in real-world settings. If, however, Experiment
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Fig. 4 Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves by mismatch prevalence group for the error-only feedback (a), full-feedback (b), and nofeedback (c) conditions in Experiment 2. Area under the curve (AUC) calculated using the trapezoidal method. To ease comparison, the third
point on each ROC for high, medium, and low mismatch prevalence is highlighted. Although the error-only and full-feedback conditions show a
more robust rightward shift along the x-axis, differences in the no-feedback group were only slight

3’s results look more like Experiment 1, then we
might expect criterion shifting, but not reduced discriminability, by prevalence and feedback conditions.
Either outcome would be informative for future research and policy recommendations.

Experiment 3
Methods
Participants

Undergraduate students (N = 85) participated in the experiment (Mage = 25.7 years; 67 female) in exchange for
partial course credit. Power analyses confirmed the sufficiency of this sample size for all omnibus tests (i.e., β −
1 > .85). Self-reported race reflected a diverse sample (7
Black/African American, 10 White/Caucasian, 61
Hispanic/Latino, 3 Asian/Pacific Islander, and 3 other

with 1 failing to respond). All participants reported
normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Materials, design, and procedure

Experiment 3 was identical to Experiment 2 in all respects except the comparison images. Participants made
100 untimed decisions about whether a target image (an
ambient image) represented the same person as an
image embedded in an ID card (a student ID image).
Results
Accuracy

As with Experiments 1 and 2, we analyzed accuracy
using a 2 (Match Type-within: match, mismatch) × 3
(Prevalence between: high, medium, low) × 3 (Feedback
between: complete, error-only, none) mixed-methods
ANOVA. We found a main effect of match type, F (1,
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74) = 18.74, p < .001, η2 p = .202, a main effect of mismatch prevalence, F (2,74) = 5.10, p = .008, η2 p = .121,
but no main effect of feedback F (2,74) = 1.32, p = .273.
However, these main effects were qualified by an interaction between match type, prevalence, and feedback, F
(4,74) = 2.39, p = .037, η2 p = .16 (Figure available in
“Additional file 1”). Simple main effects tests of mismatch prevalence on errors within each level of feedback
revealed a simple main effect of mismatch prevalence
within error-only feedback, F (2, 77) = 4.03, p = .022, η2
p = .095, and also within full feedback, F (2,77) = 10.06,
p < .001, η2 p = .207. The no-feedback condition yielded
no simple effect of mismatch prevalence.
Signal detection measures

We treated and analyzed signal detection measure data
in the same fashion as Experiments 1 and 2. For d’, a
between-subjects ANOVA revealed a main effect of mismatch prevalence, F (2,77) = 5.62, p = .005, η2 p = .127,
but no main effect of feedback, F (2,77) = 2.19, p = .119,
η2 p = .054. However, any main effects were qualified by
an interaction between mismatch prevalence and feedback, F (4,77) = 2.62, p = .041, η2 p = .12. Simple main effects of mismatch prevalence on d’ within each level of
feedback revealed only a simple main effect of mismatch
prevalence within the full-feedback condition, F (2,
77) = 9.43, p < .001, η2 p = .197. For C, a between-subjects
ANOVA revealed a main effect of mismatch prevalence,
F (2,77) = 18.14, p < .001, η2 p = .320, but no main effect
of feedback, F (2,77) = 1.68, p = .194, η2 p = .042. However, any main effects were qualified by an interaction
between mismatch prevalence and feedback, F (4,77) =
3.35, p = .014, η2 p = .148. Simple main effects of mismatch prevalence on C within each level of feedback
revealed a simple main effect of mismatch prevalence
within error-only feedback, F (2, 77) = 11.73, p < .001,
η2 p = .234, within full feedback, F (2,77) = 9.23,
p < .001, η2 p = .193, and also within no feedback, F
(2, 77) = 4.64, p < .013, η2 p = .108.
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General discussion
The primary aims of the present set of studies were
threefold: (1) to determine the effects that varying levels
of mismatch prevalence have on sensitivity and confidence ratings in a simulated serial face-identity verification task; (2) to examine whether feedback (error-only
or completely trial-by-trial) interacted with mismatch
prevalence in ways applicable to real-world scenarios,
and (3) to compare facial stimuli varying from highly
controlled images frequently used in the literature featuring low within-person variability, and two novel sets
of face-matching scenarios that capture a broader range
of within-person variability. To these ends, Experiment 1
served as a replication of Papesh and Goldinger (2014),
varying mismatch prevalence from low (20%), medium
(50%), to high (80%). In addition, it utilized controlled
facial stimuli from the Glasgow Unfamiliar Face Database used throughout face perception research. Further,
participants received feedback after making errors. Experiments 2 and 3 replicated these mismatch prevalence
conditions but used facial stimuli from the Selfies for Science database (Weatherford et al., 2016) that paired controlled images taken several months apart (Experiment
2) or paired controlled images with ambient images. In
addition, Experiments 2 and 3 manipulated feedback between participants by providing no, error-only feedback,
or full trial-by-trial feedback.
Experiment 1 found that low prevalence shifted criterion but did not substantially reduce empirical discriminability. Using different stimuli and varying feedback over
a fuller range, Experiment 2 found that low mismatch
prevalence both shifted criterion and reduced discriminability. Feedback (either trial by trial or only in the case
of errors) did not improve performance. Experiment 3
broadened the range of within-person variability, having
participants compare naturalistic ambient images to controlled images so that the matching task better corresponded to what identity screeners experience in realworld settings, with results similar to Experiment 2.

Area under the curve

Partial AUC analysis for Experiment 3 was conducted in
the same manner as Experiment 2. The overall AUC
shape and values (Fig. 5) more closely align with the
results of Experiment 2 – low mismatch prevalence reduced discriminability under all three types of feedback.
The area spanned by low mismatch prevalence (pAUC =
.41) was less than that spanned by medium mismatch
prevalence (pAUC = .45), D = 2.67, p = .007. For the
comparison between low and high mismatch prevalence,
the area spanned by low prevalence (pAUC = .34) was
less than that spanned by high mismatch prevalence
(pAUC = .39), D = 2.73, p = .006. Medium and high conditions were equivalent, p > .4.

Implications for the low-prevalence effect

Results from the current experiments lend support toward the criterion-shift explanation of the LPE (e.g.,
Wolfe et al., 2007), which proffers that, as mismatch
prevalence decreases, so does the amount of information
used to assert that two faces match.4 This, in turn, increases mismatch errors. Crossing our three levels of
feedback with three levels of prevalence allowed us to
observe whether participants shifted their response
4

We also recorded decision reaction time data as well, which revealed
no evidence supporting the early search termination account of the
low prevalence effect (e.g., Fleck & Mitroff, 2007). Analyses of these
data are reported in the “Additional file 1”
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Fig. 5 Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves by mismatch prevalence group for the error-only feedback (a), no-feedback (b), and fullfeedback (c) conditions in Experiment 3. Area under the curve (AUC) calculated using the trapezoidal method. To ease comparison, the third
point on each ROC for high, medium, and low mismatch prevalence is highlighted. Although the error-only and full-feedback conditions show a
more robust rightward shift along the x-axis, differences in the no-feedback group were more slight, with high and low mismatch prevalence
behaving similarly

criteria across our three experiments. Our explanation
of how feedback would manifest as shifting criterion was
rooted in Kluger and DeNisi’s (1996) Feedback Intervention Theory. In the current experiments, we predicted
that feedback would operate by shifting attention in presented face pairs toward cues that are typically most
diagnostic to identity, and that feedback would interact
with varying prevalence by offering fewer error signals to
individuals in the low-prevalence condition than to those
in medium and high-prevalence conditions. Such an
explanation would imply a shift in criterion that is magnified by feedback. Our feedback manipulation was successful in affecting decision-making in a straightforward
enough way to indicate a shift in criterion as we predicted. The smaller partial areas under the ROC curves
observed in low-prevalence conditions across all three of

the current experiments indicates that participants were
making more mismatch errors under comparatively
higher confidence when mismatch rates were low. As
they were maximizing the scope of information available
to make identity decisions, we interpret this as evidence
that participants in low-prevalence conditions were utilizing a more liberal response criterion compared to participants in conditions with medium and highprevalence conditions.
Security applications and future directions

The current experiments also expand upon a growing
multidisciplinary research literature aimed at aiding security
and crime control concerns throughout the world. Our use
of an ecologically valid facial database consisting of a wide
range of inter- and intra-individual differences, and our
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design manipulating mismatch prevalence reproduces a
clearer picture of real-world identity-screening conditions.
Regarding further application, much of the extant
research involving human facial-verification screeners
has focused on ways of improving their recruitment and
training in professional settings. As mentioned in the
introduction to Experiment 2, the benefits of feedback in
long-term training is generally taken as a given, with all
major training regimens implementing post-decision
feedback in some way (Towler et al., 2019). It is worth
noting, however, that some of these regimens have been
developed and are implemented without a systematic
empirical basis. The experiments reported here demonstrate that feedback can indeed help facial-matching
abilities in certain circumstances (White, Kemp, et al.,
2014), but not all. If, as argued by Papesh et al. (2018),
feedback is necessary to produce the LPE, then future
studies would need to examine whether more realistic
feedback (e.g., a passenger’s ability to produce corroborating documentation when a screener suspects a
mismatch) may provide a more optimistic outcome.
Feedback may not be the most effective intervention,
but what are possible additions or alternatives?
One possibility is for security agencies to recruit face
super-recognizers, or individuals who very easily
recognize unfamiliar faces after even brief viewings
(Bruce, Bindemann, & Lander, 2018). Bate et al. (Frowd
et al., 2019) examined the face-memory abilities of police
officers already known to exhibit superior face matching.
Officers underwent several unique face-processing tasks,
revealing that different individuals excel at different
types of face matching (i.e., quickly recognizing a face
within a crowd, matching a studied face within a small
set of nearly identical faces, etc.). In addition, some individuals excel at avoiding foils while others’ strengths lie
in choosing the correct person. The challenges in
recruiting such individuals include the fact that, although their accuracy may be many standard deviations
above average, they are not necessarily aware of their superiority and tests designed to detect super-recognition
have not been firmly established. It is worth pointing out
that, within the studies reported here, individuals were
actually excluded from some analyses for exhibiting perfect performance on match or mismatch trial types.
Given the small number of available face superrecognizers and the limitations of the tests designed to
find them, another alternative is developing more finely
tuned training regimens that can render unfamiliar face
processing as accurate as familiar face processing. Burton,
Kramer, Ritchie, and Jenkins (2016) assert that familiar
face processing is a qualitatively different phenomenon
than unfamiliar face processing. However, exposure to
multiple unique instances of the same face under different
pose, lighting, expression, and temporal variations can
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improve unfamiliar face identification (Menon, White, &
Kemp, 2015b). Therefore, any newly developed training
program should incorporate abstraction of familiarity
from multiple instances of the same faces, particularly
among individuals whom the screener may be challenged
by e.g., other-race faces; (Susa et al., 2019).
The task of an ID screener extends beyond facial comparison. Sophisticated ID documents also contain watermarks, holographic imagery, specialized inks, and other
security features that screeners must also verify. It is
possible that many screeners focus their attention and
time on these aspects of the task and give little attention
to face verification given the wide within-person variability
that they encounter. In other words, screeners may simply
verify that the ID is a legitimate government-issued document and then assume that the person providing it is also
the person in the photo. One last possibility to counter
this problem focuses not on the screeners themselves but
upon the ID documents. If documents featured multiple
images of the same face taken under different conditions
like those listed above, they may help screeners to make
more accurate, higher-confidence identity judgments (e.g.,
White, Burton, et al., 2014). A future investigation of the
LPE under more realistic conditions like those reported
here might include multiple facial images against which
an ID can be compared, and this could in turn greatly
reduce or eliminate the LPE.
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